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DEVELOPMENTS
ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt
Treaty
This Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice' is only
the third one ever requested by a United Nations specialized agency, and
the only one ever requested by the World Health Organization.2 The
Opinion is also notable due to its subject matter: it dealt with a novel
attempt to use the transfer of a specialized agency office as a means of
political retaliation. The underlying political differences had no connec-
tion with the objectives and goals of the agency. Members of the Eastern
Mediterranean Region of the World Health Organization (WHO) sought
to transfer the site of the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office
(EMRO) from Alexandria, Egypt, to Amman, Jordan, as a consequence of
their dissatisfaction over the Camp David Accords that Egypt had signed
with Israel. The Court held that regardless of any particular treaty provi-
sion, EMRO could be transferred, but that the WHO was required to give
Egypt reasonable notice of the transfer, and to negotiate in good faith so
that the transfer would be effected with minimal damage to Egypt's
interests.3
1. Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between
the World Health Organization and Egypt, [1980] I.C.J. - reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 88 (1980).
2. The other two specialized agencies requesting advisory opinions were the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Inter-Governmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization. See [1979-1980] I.C.J.Y.B. 42-3, 46-50, 116.
3. The substantive part of the opinion read as follows:
a. their mutual obligations under those legal principles and rules place a duty
both upon the Organization and upon Egypt to consult together in good faith
as to the question under what conditions and in accordance with what modali-
ties a transfer of the Regional Office from Egypt may be effected;
b. in the event of its being finally decided that the Regional Office shall be
transferred from Egypt, their mutual obligations of cooperation place a duty
upon the Organization and Egypt to consult together and to negotiate regard-
ing the various arrangements needed to effect the transfer from the existing to
the new site in an orderly manner and with a minimum of prejudice to the
work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt;
c. their .mutual obligations under those legal principles and rules place a duty
upon the party which wishes to effect the transfer to give a reasonable period
of notice to the other party for the termination of the existing situation regard-
ing the Regional Office at Alexandria, taking due account of all the practical
arrangements needed to effect an orderly and equitable transfer of the Office
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This development examines the background of the Opinion as well as
the Opinion itself. The analysis will center on the Opinion's relationship
to current international legal jurisprudence, and its possible precedential
value with respect to future requests for advisory opinions and future po-
litical retaliaton by specialized agencies. The conclusion will discuss the
Opinion's impact on international law and the Court's jurisprudence.
The background of the Opinion dates really to the time of the found-
ing of the United Nations itself. The Constitution of the WHO was ap-
proved in 1946." Under Chapter XI, the WHO sought to integrate existing
regional health organizations as it was establishing its own regions and
regonal offices. The Alexandria Sanitary Bureau had already acquired a
regional role,5 and neighboring states agreed that Alexandria should be
kept as the WHO's regional office. 6 After substantial preliminary negotia-
tions between the WHO and the government of Egypt,' EMRO started
functioning at Alexandria on 1 May 1949.8 As of that date, however,
Egypt had not yet signed the Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the Specialized Agencies, nor had it concluded the treaty with the
WHO concerning its operations in Egypt.9 Egypt granted temporary ex-
emption from customs duties, and the treaty was finally concluded on 25
March 1951.10
The next significant development occured in 1954. Due to the hostil-
ity between Israel and its neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean Re-
gion, EMRO formed two subcommittees, one of which-Subcommittee
A-excluded Israel from its membership."
The EMRO status quo remained fairly constant until the Camp
David Accords involving Egypt, Israel, and the United States. The other
regional members reacted with hostility to the Accords. 2 On 7 May 1979,
to its new site.
20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100.
4. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, opened for signature July 22,
1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
5. A Board of Health was established in 1831 to prevent the spread of disease by pil-
grims going to or returning from Mecca. It became more international in character after
that. The Egyptian government became more active in the Sanitary Bureau starting in 1938,
but it remained internationally oriented. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 90-91.
6. A number of resolutions were passed by Arab quarantine experts calling for a re-
gional organization of the WHO, with the regional office at Alexandria. Id. at 91.
7. The government of Egypt was involved, as was WHO and various of its divisions,
and the United Nations itself. Id. at 91-92.
8. Id. at 93.
9. Id.
10. Id. This temporary exemption was the only WHO-Egypt understanding governing
the EMRO until the 1951 Treaty was signed.
11. Id. at 94. Hostility had existed prior to 1954, of course, but prior to that time it had
not been deemed necessary to form two separate subcommittees.
12. Judge Morozov, in his dissent, argued that the Camp David Accords were the root
cause of the hostility. The case involved a much larger political issue than WHO internal
politics, he said, and the Court should have declined to give an opinion. Id. at 147.
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five EMRO members asked the Regional Director for a meeting to discuss
the transfer of EMRO from Egypt to another state.8 Subcommittee A
passed a resolution to transfer the EMRO on 12 May 1979.'1
On 28 May 1979, the Thirty-Second World Health Assembly con-
vened. The Assembly also adopted a resolution to transfer EMRO.' 5 The
Executive Board of WHO then established a working group to study the
matter. In its report, submitted on 16 January 1980, this group declared
that it could not ascertain whether section 37 of the 1951 Treaty was ap-
plicable.'" The report mentioned the possibility of requesting the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the matter."
In May 1980, Subcommittee A voted nineteen to one to transfer
EMRO to Amman as soon as possible.'8 During subsequent World Health
Assembly discussions, two significant views arose. One was that transfers
of regional offices should not be used as a political weapon."9 The other,
raised by the members of Subcommittee A, was that the members of a
region should be allowed to transfer their regonal office if they so
desired.0
The Assembly asked the Legal Division of the WHO whether section
37 of the 1951 Treaty applied. 21 Like the working group, the Legal Divi-
sion could not decide. Finally, on 21 May 1980, the Thirty-Third World
Health Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the Court.
22
13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. Egypt was not represented at the meeting during which the resolution was ap-
proved, and had tried to have the meeting postponed.
15. Due to allegations by Egypt, the Assembly established a committee to study the
matter. This committee felt that more study was needed and recommended that the Execu-
tive Board undertake such a study. Id.
16. Id. For the text of section 37 of the Treaty, see note 25 infra.
17. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 95.
18. Id. Egypt cast the opposing vote.
19. In his separate opinion, Judge Gros maintained that since the WHO Constitution
contained only health-oriented objectives, such a transfer for political reasons was essen-
tially an ultra vires act. He would have preferred that the Court address that point. Id. at
102-03.
20. These members also argued that retaining EMRO in Alexandria would be harmful
to the WHO's work. Perhaps to fulfill that prediction, the majority of the members notified
the WHO's District-General three days later that they would "boycott" EMRO as long as it
remained in Alexandria. Id. at 95.
21. Id.
22. The Assembly posed two questions to the Court:
1. Are the negotiations and notice provisions of section 37 of the Agreement of
25 March 1951 between the World Health Organization and Egypt applicable
in the event that either party to the Agreefnent wishes to have the Regional
Office transferred from the territory of Egypt?
2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both the World Health Or-
ganization and Egypt, with regard to the Regional Office in Alexandria, during
the two year period between notice and termination of the Agreement?
Id. at 89.
1981
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The Court delivered its opinion on 20 December 1980.11 After
describing the historical and procedural background of the case, the
Court briefly discussed its discretion in deciding to issue an advisory
opinion on the matter."2
The arguments before the Court dealt with the applicability of the
1951 Treaty in general, and with section 37 in particular."5 Nevertheless,
in order to address the true legal problems at issue, the Court rephrased
the questions it had been presented with in the following manner: "What
are the legal principles and rules applicable to the questions under what
conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Re-
gional Office from Egypt may be effected?"ss The Court maintained that
it might be misleading to address only the questions asked.27 In the past,
the Court had occasionally rephrased questions, as had its predecessor,
the Permanent Court of International Justice."2
23. Id. at 88.
24. Id. at 95. The Court did not feel it should refrain from issuing an Advisory Opinion
merely because "political considerations" played a major role in the underlying situation.
Indeed, the Court felt that that could increase the need for an agency to obtain an advisory
opinion. Judge Morozov disagreed, note 12 supra.
25. Regarding the 1951 Treaty in general, one argument maintains that EMRO was
established on 1 July 1949. The 1951 Treaty was a separate and later transaction, which
merely provided for privileges, immunities, and facilities. The opposing view was that the
1951 Treaty was the culmination of a series of steps, and that EMRO was not finally estab-
lished until the conclusion of the Treaty. Id. at 97.
Even assuming the 1951 Treaty were applicable, there was still disagreement as to
whether section 37 applied to a transfer of EMRO. Section 37 reads as follows:
Section 37. The present Agreement may be revised at the request of either
party. In this event the two parties shall consult each other concerning the
modifications to be made in its provisions. If the negotiations do not result in
an understanding within one year, the present Agreement may be denounced
by either party giving two year's notice.
One viewpoint holds that "revise," by its law dictionary definition, means a modifica-
tion but not a termination or denunciation. Thus, since section 37 concerned revisions, the
entire section, including the two year notice, was inapplicable. Since there is no provision
for outright denunciation (as opposed to denunciation after unsuccessful attempts at revi-
sion), article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and its counterpart in the
International Law Commission's draft articles on treaties between states and international
organizations, is applicable. Essentially, article 56 and its counterpart allow for denuncia-
tions if the right is implied, but require 12 months notice. Id. at 97; see [1979] Y.B. INr'L L.
COMM'N 146.
The opposing viewpoint holds that "revise" really has a broader meaning, which in-
cludes termination. The travaux preparatoires of section 37 in the ILO-Swiss negotiations,
for example, provide for denunciation after consultation and negotiation. That section is the
same as that in the 1951 Treaty, and thus the same rationale applies. See 20 INr'L LEGAL
MAT. 88, 97-98 (1980).
26. Although the Court articulated the arguments, as summarized above, it did not find
any of them controlling, and rephrased the question before discussing the arguments in de-
tail. Id. at 96.
27. Id.
28. Id. Cf. Note, 22 H~Av. INT'L L.J. 429, 435 (1981), which distinguishes the cases cited
by the Court in that it nevertheless limited its holding to the questions asked, which it did
not do in the present Opinion.
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Regarding the right of specialized agencies to transfer offices, the
Opinion recognized that right, but stressed that it was not completely un-
fettered.2 9 Specialized agencies are still subject to rules of international
law. The establishment of EMRO at Alexandria (whether deemed created
by the 1951 Treaty or not) did establish a "contractual legal regime"80
between the WHO and Egypt. The essence of this regime was that both
parties owe the other a duty to cooperate and act in good faith.81 The
exact obligations would depend on the exact circumstances, but in a situ-
ation as complex and involved as transferring a regional office, the Court
indicated that the obligations would be substantial.32 Considering sources
other than the 1951 Treaty, the Court went on to state that before trans-
ferring EMRO, the transferring party would be required to give the other
party reasonable notice, and to have a reasonable regard for the interests
of the other party.8 8 To that end, both parties must cooperate to ensure
an orderly transfer.8 '
The Court determined that there was a duty to provide "a reasonable
period of notice," 9 but it did not define how long "reasonable" was. What
was reasonable would depend on the circumstances in a given case, keep-
ing in mind the "paramount consideration" of promoting "the objectives
29. Like states, international organizations are subject to international law in general,
as well as to their own constitutions and to international agreements. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 95-96.
30. Id. at 98.
31. In addition to the existence of EMRO in Alexandria, both parties had mutual du-
ties due to the fact Egypt was a member of WHO. Id.
32. While the practical problems to be resolved were the concern of WHO and Egypt,
their magnitude could have a bearing on the legal conditions under which EMRO could be
transferred. Id.
33. Id.
34. The substantive Court opinion concerning the duties and obligations under interna-
tional legal principles came in three parts:
In the first place, those obligations place a duty both upon the Organization
and upon Egypt to consult together in good faith as to the question under
what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Re-
gional Office from Egypt may be effected.
Second, in the event of its being finally decided that the Regional Office shall
be transferred from Egypt, their mutual obligations of cooperation place a duty
upon the Organization and Egypt to consult together and to negotiate regard-
ing the various arrangements needed to effect the transfer from the existing to
the new site in an orderly manner and with a minimum or prejudice to the
work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt.
Third, those mutual obligations place a duty upon the party which wishes to
effect the transfer to give a reasonable period of notice to the other party for
the termination of the existing situation regarding the Regional Office at Alex-
andria, taking due account of all the practical arrangements needed to effect
the orderly and equitable transfer of the Office to its new site.
The ultimate purpose of the obligations was to transfer with a minimum of harm to the
interests of either party. Id. at 99-100. Paragraph 49 became the actual holding.
35. Id., part three of the substantive opinion.
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and purposes of the Organization as expressed in its Constitution."" Al-
though the Court did not specify a period of time it would consider rea-
sonable (leaving that up to the parties), 7 it did mention section 3738 and
article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as adopted
by the International Law Commission's draft articles on treaties concern-
ing international organizations.3'
The Court did not "make" any new law. Nor was any of its reasoning
without precedent. Nevertheless, the fact that the opinion was requested,
the fact that the Court went beyond the question asked, and the holding
itself, all have significance for the future.
With respect to the fact that the advisory opinion was requested by a
United Nations specialized agency, that in itself is significant. " Certainly,
a total of three such requests in the Court's history cannot be considered
a "trend." Yet this Opinion could induce other specialized agencies to
seek advisory opinions. Several agencies could face pressure to engage in
retaliatory moves having nothing to do with their specialized function. " '
If an agency could not decide what course of action were proper, it could
request an advisory opinion. Such a request also serves to diffuse the ill-
feeling a disappointed party may feel towards the agency. Regardless of
the nature of the question, or the party posing it, a greater use of the
advisory opinion function could make the Court a more viable and insti-
36. Id. But cf. the opinion of Judge Gros, supra note 19, where he argues a transfer for
political reasons is outside the WHO's Constitution.
37. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100.
38. Section 37 provided for two years notice. The text is at note 25 supra.
39. This provided for 12 months notice. The article is summarized at note 25 supra.
40. This was only the third opinion ever requested by a specialized agency. Note 2
supra.
41. Five other specialized agencies are organized along the lines of WHO, with diverse
regional offices in areas with actual and potential serious political differences. If WHO were
allowed to be used as an instrument of political retaliation, several of the other agencies
might also face pressure to transfer regional offices for retaliatory purposes.
For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the In-
ternational Development Association share offices in Nairobi, Abidjan, and Bangkok. How-
ever, fear of losing loans and contributions would probably inhibit any retaliatory moves.
The International Labor Organization (whose own Headquarters Treaty was discussed in
the WHO Opinion) has regional offices in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, and Lima, as well as 40
local offices. It could face regional partisan pressure for a move of its offices. The Interna-
tional Finance Corporation has regional offices in Manila, Nairobi, and Abidjan. It, too,
could face political pressure for office transfers.
Two other agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have regional offices in Cairo. FAO also has re-
gional offices in Accra, Bangkok, Rome, and Santiago. ICAO's other offices are in Dakar,
Paris, Bangkok, Mexico City, and Lima. The WHO itself has other regional offices in Braz-
zaville, Washington, New Delhi, Copenhagen, and Manila. Several of the locations might
have received pressure for transfers had this opinion made retaliatory transfers easier.
The other U.N. specialized agencies have one principle office, without regional offices
over different parts of the world. See (1977] U.N.Y.B. 1067 et seq., which describes each of
the specialized agencies and their organization.
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tutionalized source of international law.4"
As the Court pointed out, not rephrasing a question posed could re-
sult in a misleading answer. However, as one commentator has pointed
out, such rephrasing may inhibit agencies or parties from requesting advi-
sory opinions; they may not want to risk an answer to a question they did
not ask.'
The substantive portion of the opinion may prevent a pernicious ma-
nipulation of the specialized agencies as instruments of political retalia-
tion to the detriment of their specialized functions. This manipulation
could be even more harmful when employed in short; term disagree-
ments."' At the same time, however, the Court recognized the rights of
members to run the agencies, and their particular regional offices, as they
see fit, taking into account the rights of other parties. A drawback, how-
ever, is the use of other means of political retaliation."
The abstractness of the substantive portion of the opinion offers a
general standard to be considered, regardless of specific treaty provisions
in a given situation." The Court realistically states, for example, that rea-
sonable notice is a function of the particular circumstances. Yet, it could
have perhaps suggested a more concrete period of notice i4 since the two
parties are unlikely to agree on the matter. Along similar lines, there is
the problem of defining good faith. Again, the two parties are unlikely to
agree.
This opinion has another potential problem in that the actual imple-
menting parties did not request the Opinion.'" The WHO, as an institu-
tion, may be willing to follow the opinion, but the individual members of
the Eastern Mediterranean Region may not be. Egypt also may not be
willing to follow the Opinion, especially if it perceives that its neighbors
are not doing so.
42. While more advisory opinion activity may give the Court a greater role in formulat-
ing international law, the Court runs the risk of losing its status and prestige if it becomes
too active. M. POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE
LEAGUE AND UNITED NATIONS ERAS (1973); Lalonde, The Death of the Eastern Carelia Doc-
trine: Has Compulsory Jurisdiction Arrived in the World Court?, 37 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REV. 80, 99 (1979).
43. Note, supra note 28, at 435-36.
44. While the Israel-Arab hostility is long term, the Egypt-Arab rift is not necessarily
so.
45. In the Egypt-Arab rift, for example, the Economic Commission for Western Asia
recommended admitting Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1977. However,
it later voted to suspend Egypt. [1977] U.N.Y.B. 604-07; W. LANDSKRON, ANNUAL REVIgw OF
UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 181 (1981).
46. Such provisions include the duties of good faith, cooperation, and, if appropriate,
notice. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100, also listed in note 34 supra.
47. A compromise period of 18 months, for example, might have been workable and
appropriate. That would have split the difference between the periods in section 37 of the
WHO-Egypt Treaty and article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
48. The WHO requested the opinion, not Egypt nor the EMRO members desiring the
transfer.
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Both the future of the specialized agencies and of the Court itself are
likely to be affected by this Opinion. Specialized agencies have the pre-
rogative to transfer their offices, but they must consult in good faith and
give reasonable notice to the host state.49 This duty exists regardless of
particular host agreement provisions. This should serve to stifle manipu-
lation of regional offices as a means of political retaliation for extrinsic
differences. Moreover, other specialized agencies may now be more willing
to seek advisory opinions from the Court. By rephrasing the questions
asked, the Court was able to give a more complete answer, but it risks
deterring requests for opinions by agencies wary of rephrasing. In the
long run, this opinion should turn out to be a positive step for both the
Court and the specialized agencies, and ultimately for all member states
of the United Nations.
Charles A. Wintermeyer, Jr.
Risk of Loss in Shipping Under the
Hamburg Rules
INTRODUCTION
In March 1978, the United Nations held a conference on the carriage
of goods by sea in Hamburg, West Germany. Twenty-seven conference
participants signed the resulting convention.1 The rules embodied in the
convention dramatically changed and simplified the basic legal relation-
ships between cargo shipper and cargo carrier in regard to allocation of
risk.
The purpose of this development is to examine the new rules of mari-
time shipping in light of historical experience and the contemporary envi-
ronment. Inquiry will be made into the theoretical soundness and antici-
pated effects of the new rules. The prevailing pragmatic question of
whether the rules can expect widespread ratification will also be enter-
tained. First, a brief examination will be made of the rules traditionally
49. See 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 99-100.
1. The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89, reprinted in 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 421 (1979). The convention was
signed by Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, the Holy See, Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Sweden, the United States, Venezuela, and Zaire.
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